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Abstract 
Denial of Service Attacks represent a major threat to modern organisations who are 
increasing dependent upon the integrity of their computer networks.    This paper presents a 
new approach to combating such threats by introducing active routers into the network 
architecture.   These active routers offer the combined benefits of intrusion detection, firewall 
functionality and data encryption and work collaboratively to provide a distributed defence 
mechanism.   The paper provides a detailed description of the design and operation of the 
algorithms used by the active routers and demonstrates how this approach is able to defeat a 
SYN and SMURF attack.  Other approaches to network design, such as the introduction of a 
firewall and intrusion detection systems, can be used to protect networks however, 
weaknesses remain.   Within the paper it is proposed that the adoption of an active router 
based approach to protecting networks overcomes many of these weaknesses and therefore 
offers enhanced protection. 
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1. Introduction 
Most organisations are today totally dependent upon the performance and integrity of their 
network infrastructures.  Coupled to this growth in dependency, these organisations have seen 
a significant increase in the threats posed to such networks, resulting in incidents of serious 
attack and the ensuing business impacts.  Whereas the first generation of attackers required a 
thorough knowledge of computing, communication protocols and networks, the widespread 
availability of free web-based attacking tools has brought about a new generation that requires 
far less detailed knowledge.  Consequently since 1988 there has been a 3,000% increase in the 
number of serious incidents of attack reported by CERT [1].    
 
Denial of Service attacks [2] aim to disrupt a legitimate user’s access to the network, servers, 
or applications by either targeting a server directly or by consuming network bandwidth.   A 
SYN attack [3] aims to target a server’s resources by preventing new TCP connections being 
accepted by repeatedly failing to complete the TCP connection three-way handshake protocol 
through the withholding of the final SYN ACK PDU.       Network resources can also be 
targeted by the SMURF [4] attack, which is based on the Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP) where a sequence of ICMP Echo Request PDUs are issued with a fictitious or 
spoofed IP source addresses.   Each host receiving one of these PDUs is required to respond 
with an ICMP Echo Reply PDU hence, generating excessive traffic that  can ultimately 
overload network resources and greatly impair the throughput available to legitimate network 
traffic. 
 
Whilst solutions to these attacks have been proposed and implemented, this paper reports on a 
new approach [5] that creates a network design in which defence intelligence is distributed 
across a set of active routers that work collectively to offer an integrated approach to the 
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defeat of typical denial of service attacks.  We believe that this integrated approach provides a 
more robust defence against well known attacks and overcomes limitations inherent within 
current solutions. 
 
2. Defeating Denial of Service Attacks 
A significant amount of work has been undertaken to develop techniques for defeating denial 
of service attacks.   The traditional first line of defence is the firewall [6].  However, firewalls 
do suffer from a number of limitations, which include the inability to detect an attack arising 
from a host ‘behind’ the firewall.  Once a firewall has been compromised then the whole 
network becomes vulnerable and because a firewall blocks an attack at the victim side, then a 
firewall cannot prevent an attacker from initiating further attacks.   
 
Techniques such as traffic rate limiting and trace back are effective at combating denial of 
service attacks, but do require time to observe network traffic profiles in order to deduce that 
an attack is in progress.  During this time network users must suffer some loss of service or 
degradation in performance.  Equally, when the attacker uses a fictitious IP address it takes 
longer to trace such attacks back to their point of origin.    
 
Active networks allow the network itself to execute program code up to the Application layer 
on packet contents.  This can be achieved by embedding code within packets which is then 
executed by routers, or by providing a pointer within a packet to specific executable code 
within a router.   Using this processing capability, active network technology is now being 
exploited to defeat denial of service attacks through the deployment of active routers within a 
network infrastructure.   
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The Intrusion Blocker based on Active Networks (IBAN) [7], transports active code between 
active nodes so that a scanner function can analyse hosts for vulnerabilities.  Based on this 
analysis, a blocker function is then downloaded to an active router to detect and block known 
attack profiles.   Active Shaping [8] deploys an active component comprising a probe active 
component (PAC) and a traffic control active component (TAC) to all active routers.  Routers 
maintain three types of queue per interface: normal queue, suspicious queue, and malicious 
queue.   The PAC monitors traffic and if within acceptable traffic flows, passes it to the 
normal queue.   However, if an  identifiable traffic flow exceeds some traffic threshold value, 
then it is regarded as suspicious, transferred to the suspicious queue, and an attack profile 
configured.   The TAC then rate controls this suspicious traffic through a configurable filter 
function.   When the attack is confirmed, traffic is then passed to the malicious queue from 
which a backtrack message is sent to the up stream router to also apply rate limiting on the 
flow.  This backtrack message will propagate towards the source of the attack.   The Active 
Security System (ASSYST) [9] allows routers to interact through an Active Security Protocol 
(ASP) to isolate the source of the denial of service attack.   The ASP provides a set of 
messages that propagate between routers to enable them to identify the malicious traffic and 
adopt a defence strategy.    A series of alert messages allow routers to determine the path of 
the attack and then to employ traffic shaping to limit the suspicious traffic flow.      
 
There are several limitations with current active network solutions namely that there is often 
an assumption that all routers within a network are active; that the time taken for active code 
to propagate through the network can be excessive; that large volumes of signalling messages 
are generated, and there is a limited range of denial of service attack profiles that can be 
adequately combated. 
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3. Distributing Defence Intelligence 
This paper presents a new approach to the adoption of active networking for the defeat of 
denial of service attacks.  A novel active-router based architecture is presented that offers the 
integration of a cryptographic algorithm, firewall functionality, and intrusion detection into a 
series of distributed active routers that communicate using an active protocol. The distributed 
architecture offers many advantages in defending against well-known types of denial of 
service attack. The rationale behind the integrated approach is based on the fact that each of 
these components has limitations but, when combined, these limitations can be overcome by 
another component function.  
 
For example, a firewall cannot detect attacks (such as SMURF attack) that are embedded 
within ‘normal’ traffic. Intrusion detection can however, detect this type of attack. Equally, 
distributing firewall functionality and intrusion detection, allows for the detection and 
blocking of an attack at different points in the network to overcome some of the traditional 
firewall limitations. A distributed architecture ensures that the network is no longer a single 
point of failure, so that an attacker has to pass through different layers of protection before 
they reach the victim. Distributing a cryptographic algorithm among routers in the network 
allows them to authenticate packets coming either from the end user or from other routers. 
This also protects the network against packet sniffing, because all packets traversing through 
the network are encrypted. In other words, a router is working on behalf of the clients to 
protect their transmission data depending on a pre-defined security policy inside the router.  
 
4. The Active Router Architecture 
Active routers are distributed throughout a network architecture, however, there is no 
requirement for all routers to become active.    These active routers communicate using a 
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dedicated active protocol that has its own defined packet formats, that include active packets, 
active packet deny, and active packet acknowledgments.  In contrast, passive packets are 
packets issued by non active nodes and in the context of this work are considered to be IP 
datagrams.   Given the fact that not all routers are active, an active router discovery protocol is 
also defined to allow active routers to determine the address and location of all other active 
routers within the same overall network architecture.   This involves the generation of an 
active packet that it broadcast over each subnet to which the active router is attached.   The 
generation of these packets is determined by a timer that is configured on the one hand, to 
minimise excess traffic on the network and on the other, to allow the network to dynamically 
adapt to the introduction and removal of active routers.  These packet also contain a security 
code that allows active routers to validate each other and more importantly, to detect if an 
active router has been compromised. 
 
When the active routers are initialised they can commence normal packet processing.  In order 
to pass traffic between active routers, dedicated TCP connections are opened between pairs of 
active routers to not only ensure that network traffic is protected from packet sniffing attacks, 
but to also overcome the backtracking message limitation [8].   In this way, active routers do 
not need to send traffic filters from one hop to another, in order to block the attack.  Instead, 
the active routers can immediately send a block command in an active packet to the other end 
router with the relevant attack signature. This mechanism can protect the victim behind the 
active router even if the attacker generates a random spoofed IP source address.   Like most 
existing active network schemes our approach also uses attack pattern recognition and rate 
limiting to detect and control the attack. Therefore, if an active router detects an attack 
attempt it will send an active packet to the other edge active router to block the attacking 
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packets. Unlike some other approaches [10,11,12,13,14], this architecture allows the network 
to work without relying on a central management server.    
 
When an active router receives a passive packet it will process it through an intrusion 
detection process to check if the packet possesses any attack signatures. If the packet passes 
that test, then it will be compared against the firewall security policy to determine if this 
packet complies with the network security policy. Finally, the active router will apply a 
cryptographic algorithm that is used to specify the type of encryption and authentication that 
will be applied to the current connection and used to secure data transfer between active 
routers.  
 
The passive packet process determines how the active router will handle the received passive 
packet as shown in figure 1. Thus, if the received passive packet is destined to a directly 
connected subnet, then the passive packet process will send that packet through the SYN and 
SMURF attack defending processes.  In order for the active router to detect a SYN or 
SMURF attack it applies a rate limit on received connection requests and ICMP Ping packets. 
If an active router detects an attack it will drop the received packets and send an active packet 
deny to the edge active router to block the attack.  The active packet deny contains the attack 
signature, and the time during which the attack must be blocked.   
 
If the received passive packet is from a directly connected subnet, then depending on the 
passive packet type, the active router will either generate an active packet, or apply the 
required security policy to the passive packet before forwarding it. However, if the passive 
packet is not from a directly connected subnet then the active router will forward that packet. 
The active packet process is responsible for processing received active packets to determine 
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how the active router will handle packets. If the active packet contains an encapsulated  
passive packet that is part of the connection establishment phase, then the active router will 
extract the passive packet and then either pass the extracted passive packet to the passive 
packet process or send it to the output queue.  If the active packet carries a security policy 
then the active router will store the relevant information in the active router tables and 
generate an active packet acknowledgment. When the active packet process receives an active 
deny packet it will extract the relevant information and adds it to a Deny Table. Whenever an 
active router receives an active packet acknowledgment, it will compare the received packet 
with its tables and start forwarding packets from a directly connected client with the agreed 
security policy applied to them. However, if the active packet acknowledgment is not destined 
to the active router then it will be forwarded.  
 
To illustrate the basic operation of our scheme, figure 2 shows a client (200.30.10.69) wishing 
to establish  a TCP connection with a server (200.30.10.130) on a different subnet.  The two 
edge routers for these subnets are R4 and R2.   When R4 receives a TCP connection 
establishment request packet on port 2 from the client at time 1, it completes a Log File with 
the packet header information.   R4 then generates an active packet that encapsulates the 
received passive packet that is received by R2 at time 2.  The original passive packet is then 
extracted and passed through an intrusion detection process before being delivered to the 
server.    When R2 receives a reply from the server at time 3, it will encapsulate this passive 
packet into an active packet which is sent to R4.  It will also complete the TCP handshake 
with the server by issuing an ACK on behalf of the client.  When R4 receives the active 
packet at time 4, it will extract the passive packet and forward it to the final destination. When 
the client replies with the ACK packet at time 5, R4 will then intercept the packet and 
compare the packet header with the contents of the Log File Table. If R4 does not find the 
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packet information in the Log File Table, it will discard the packet; otherwise, it will set the 
ACK Flag field in the Log File Table. 
 
When R4 receives the first data packet from the client at time 7, it will encapsulate it within 
an active packet and send it to R2.  On receipt, R2 will confirm that this active packet is using 
the agreed security policy, and generate an active packet acknowledgment and send it back to 
R4.   When this acknowledgement is received R4, it will set the A.P Ack Flag in its Log File 
Table and delete the active packet entry from its Table of Contents.  From now on, R4 will 
encrypt other passive packets from this traffic flow using the agreed encryption scheme.   
 
When R4 receives a connection termination from the client, it will encapsulate this passive 
packet into an active packet and send it to R2 that will then forward the original passive 
packet to the server.   The connection termination from the server is received by R2 and 
forwarded to R4 within an active packet, which completes the transaction. 
 
Clearly active routers used in our integrated approach do add an additional processing 
overhead to the conventional router’s forwarding functionality by passing received packets to 
the active protocol process.     In order to minimise this impact on the overall network 
architecture,  it is only the edge active routers that are required to pass received packets to the 
active protocol processor.   All intermediate active routers, which receive traffic from non-
directly connected clients, need only forward the received traffic without passing it to the 
active protocol process, because a connection has already been established between the edge 
active routers.  
 
5. Defeating a SYN Attack 
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To detect a SYN attack attempt, active routers need to count how many connection request 
packets (SYN =1) have been received from either the same client or from the same router.   In 
order to validate the protocol logic of our scheme, a bespoke C++ simulation environment has 
been developed.  This provides an idealised representation of networks and is able to model 
packet transfer within a network.   The key aim of this simulation is to prove that our scheme 
has the functionality required to defeat denial of service attacks, rather than to assess overall 
system performance in terms of throughput or delay.   Figure 3 illustrates the network 
architecture used to assess a range of attack scenarios. 
 
Assume that an attacker located on LAN 3 attempts a SYN attack on Server 2 (200.30.10.68) 
located on LAN 2.   The attacker conceals their identity by sending a stream of connection 
request packets to Server 2 each with a different spoofed IP source address from subnet LAN 
3.  This scenario shows how active routers R2 and R4 can deal with such an attack and at the 
same time allow other traffic to pass through.   This traffic is generated by  client 
(200.30.10.210) located on LAN 4 sending to server 2 (200.30.10.68) on LAN 2, client 
(200.30.10.90) located on LAN 2 sending to server 3 (200.30.10.130) on LAN 3, client 
(200.30.10.144) located on LAN 3 sending to server 1 (200.30.10.45) on LAN 1 and client 
(200.30.10.40) located on LAN 1 sending to Server 3 (200.30.10.130) on LAN 3.    
 
When the timer used for blocking the attack traffic from LAN 3 to LAN 2 expires in both R2 
and R4, these two routers will then start allowing traffic to pass from LAN 3 (200.30.10.140) 
to Server 2 (200.30.10.68) on LAN 2 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the protocol time sequence diagram generated from our simulation 
environment.   Every time R2 receives a connection request packet, it will encapsulate the 
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passive packet into an active packet and forward it to R4.  When R4 receives the active 
packet, it will extract the connection request packet and fill the intrusion detection table with 
the packet header information before forwarding the packet to Server 2.  For example, when 
R4 receives the active packet at time 2, it will extract the passive packet, and fill the intrusion 
detection table as shown.  Because this is the first connection request packet received that has 
an IP source address 200.30.10.140, R4 will then set the SYN from same client field in the 
intrusion detection table to 1. In addition, because this is the first time R4 receives a 
connection request packet from a client that is directly connected to R2, R4 will then set the 
SYN from same Router to 1.  When R4 receives another connection request packet at time 3, 
it will check its header against the intrusion detection table entries, and notice that it is a 
connection request packet from a new IP source address 200.30.10.131 but that it is from the 
same active router R2. Therefore, R4 will set the SYN from same Client field to 1 for this 
packet entry, and will set the SYN from same Router to 2 as shown in the shaded area in the 
intrusion detection table at time 3.  
 
Every time R4 receives a connection request packet, it will keep incrementing the SYN from 
the same Router field as long as it does not violate the defined rate limit for receiving a SYN 
from the same Router.  The rate limit for receiving connection request packets from different 
clients, all coming from the same subnet, is set to 10. Therefore, when R4 receives the tenth 
connection request packet at time 11 from a client connected to R2, R4 will speculate that 
these are SYN attack attempts and it will start blocking this traffic.   R4 informs R2 to block 
the suspected SYN attack traffic, by sending an active packet deny. 
 
The data field in the active packet deny then informs the destination edge active router about 
the attack signature, such as the source and destination address, the type of the attack packets 
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to block and the time period during which the attack profile must be blocked.  In this case, the 
source address is set to any, the destination address is 200.30.10.68 and the time period is 20s. 
When R2 receives the active packet deny at time 12, it will validate the packet and fill its 
Deny Table with the attack packet signature as shown in the shaded area in the Deny Table in 
R2 at time 12. Consequently, when R2 receives connection request packets from two new 
clients 200.30.10.133 and 200.30.10.145 located on LAN 3 at time 12 and 13 respectively, it 
blocks their packets from passing through.  
 
Whilst R2 is blocking all clients located on LAN 3 attempting to open a connection with 
Server 2, it still allows other traffic to pass through. For example, at time 22 client 
200.30.10.144 located on LAN 3 sends a connection request packet to Server 1. When R2 
receives this packet, it will compare this passive packet with the Deny Table, encapsulate the 
packet into an active packet and send it to R1. When R1 receives the packet at time 23, it will 
fill the intrusion detection table and forward the extracted passive packet to Server 1. At time 
21, when client 200.30.10.40 on LAN 1 sends a connection request packet to Server 3, this 
traffic is then allowed to pass through by R1 and R2. 
 
Equally while R4 is blocking any client connected to R2 from sending connection request 
packets to Server 2, it will also allow clients from other subnets to pass through. For example, 
at time 14, client 200.30.10.210 on LAN 4 sends a connection request packet to Server 2. 
When R4 receives the client packet encapsulated into an active packet at time 16, it will 
extract the connection request packet and fill the intrusion detection table as shown in the 
shaded area in the intrusion detection table in R4 at time 16.   R4 then forwards the packet to 
Server 2.   Traffic passing in the opposite direction to the original attack has not been blocked 
and when R4 receives a connection request packet from client 200.30.10.90 on LAN 2, it 
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encapsulates the packet and forwards it to R2.  When R2 receives the active packet at time 19, 
it extracts the connection request packet and forwards it to Server 3.  Finally, at time 33 the 
Timer field in both the Deny Table in R2 and the intrusion detection table in R4 expires and 
traffic from LAN 3 can once again access Server 2. 
 
This example has illustrated that our proposed active router integrated architecture is able to 
protect the network even if an attacker generates a random spoofed IP source address to 
accomplish a SYN attack.   This attack is blocked close to the attack origin.   The system can 
also automatically reconfigure after detecting and blocking an attack in order to permit other 
traffic to pass through.  In additional it can ensure that blocking traffic from a specific subnet 
does not affect traffic from other subnets and traffic passing in the opposite direction to an 
attack continues to flow through the network. 
 
6. Defeating a SMURF Attack 
To detect a SMURF attack active routers count how many broadcast ICMP Ping packets have 
been received from either the same client or from the same router.  Our simulation 
environment has set these limits to 4 and 5 respectively in order to observe the functionality 
of our scheme.   
 
In figure 5 we assume that an attacker located on LAN 3 sends a stream of broadcast ICMP 
Ping packets to LAN 1 (200.30.10.63) using a random spoofed IP source address to make it 
harder for the active router to detect and block their attack traffic.  At the same time, a 
legitimate client 200.30.10.200 located on LAN 4 sends a broadcast ICMP Ping packet to 
LAN 1. 
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When R2 receives the first ICMP Ping packet with an IP source address 200.30.10.133 at time 
1, it will encapsulate the passive packet into an active packet and forward it to R1. When R1 
receives the active packet at time 2, it will extract the ICMP Ping and fill the intrusion 
detection table as shown in the shaded area in the intrusion detection table at time 2.  R1 will 
set both the ICMP from same Client and the ICMP from same Router field to 1 because it is 
the first time R1 has received an ICMP Ping packet from a client connected to R2.  When R1 
receives a broadcast ICMP Ping packet with IP address 200.30.10.131 at time 5, it will 
compare the packet with the intrusion detection table entries and note that this is the second 
packet from the subnet directly connected to R2 and increment the ICMP from same Router 
field.  It will continue to do this every time it receives a broadcast ICMP Ping packet from a 
different client on the directly connected subnet to R2.   At time 14, the rate limit for 
receiving broadcast ICMP Ping packets from the same router is violated and R1 will block the 
traffic, generate an active packet deny and send it to R2. 
 
The Data field in the active packet deny contains the attack signature of the traffic to block.  
In this case, the active packet deny specifies that any broadcast ICMP Ping packets coming 
from the directly connected subnet and destined for LAN 1 (200.30.10.63) should be blocked 
for a period of time.  Thus, when R2 receives a broadcast ICMP Ping packet at time 16, it will 
block the packet because the packet header matches the contents of its Deny Table.  
 
Note however, that when R3 receives a broadcast ICMP Ping packet from client 
200.30.10.200, it will encapsulate the packet and forward it to R1. When R1 receives the 
packet at time 16, it will check the intrusion detection table to decide either to allow the 
packet to pass through or not. Then R1 will fill the intrusion detection table with the received 
packet header information and it will allow the packet to pass through.  When R1 receives the 
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ICMP Reply packets, it will encapsulate them and forward them to R3. When R3 receives the 
active packets it will extract the ICMP Reply and forward them to the final destination. 
 
This example has illustrated that our proposed active router integrated architecture is able to 
defeat SMURF attacks by testing received ICMP traffic against defined thresholds.   It allows 
ICMP packets not associated with a suspected attack to pass through the network normally 
and it can detect a SMURF attack even if the attacker uses a range of spoofed IP source 
addresses. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The challenge facing today’s computer networks is to protect them from malicious attacks 
and threats originating from both inside and outside of an organisation’s infrastructure.  We 
have proposed a new approach that deploys active routers within a network to provide a 
distributed and adaptable defence system.   
 
Each active router integrates firewall functionality, intrusion detection, and a cryptographic 
algorithm.  The firewall and the intrusion detection are used to detect and block attack traffic 
coming from or going to a network. The cryptographic algorithm is used by the active routers 
to provide a secure communication between end users on their behalf. In addition, active 
routers use a dedicated active protocol to control the traffic passing through them, and to 
detect and to block the attack close to its origin.  
 
We have, through simulation, demonstrated that our proposed architecture has the required 
functionality to defeat well known attack types.  Using a distributed approach overcomes the 
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limitation of conventional techniques that deploy a single firewall or management station to 
protect an entire network.    Each active router provides its own protection of its attached 
subnets and collectively they are able to offer a strong defence for the whole network.   Even 
if an active router is directly connected to two subnets, it can still protect one subnet from an 
attacker coming from the other subnet.  Should an active router become compromised then 
the others continue to protect the network.   The adoption of an active router approach also 
allows each one to adapt in real time and reconfigure to block certain traffic profiles whilst 
allowing others to pass through.    Using a distributed array of active routers also means that 
when an attack is detected then it can be traced back and blocked at the active router that is 
closest to the point of origin of the attack.  Finally, the adoption of data encryption between 
active routers adds further protection against an attacker originating from within the network. 
 
We therefore believe that this paper has demonstrated that an active router based approach to 
defeating denial of service attacks is feasible and offers many potential benefits over current 
approaches being used to protect computer networks. 
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